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Abstract
Recent empirical work shows that a better legal environment leads to lower
expected rates of return in an international cross-section of countries. This
paper investigates whether diﬀerences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance
also help to explain expected returns in a cross-section of ﬁrms within a
single jurisdiction. Constructing a corporate governance rating (CGR) for
German ﬁrms, we document a positive relationship between the CGR and
ﬁrm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are
negatively correlated with the CGR, if dividend yields and price-earnings
ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital. Most results are robust
for endogeneity, with causation running from corporate governance prac-
tices to ﬁrm fundamentals. Finally, an investment strategy that bought
high-CGR ﬁrms and shorted low-CGR ﬁrms would have earned abnormal
returns of around 12 percent on an annual basis during the sample period.
We rationalize the empirical evidence with lower agency costs and/or the
removal of certain governance malfunctions for the high-CGR ﬁrms.
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In the past few years, corporate governance has become a popular area of dis-
cussion in Europe and, increasingly, also in Germany. Having been a topic of
academic research for a long time in the Anglo-Saxon literature, corporate gov-
ernance has only recently moved from a special interest into all sections of the
corporate sector and the political scene. In Germany, the recent publication of
the German Corporate Governance Code for publicly listed companies has fur-
ther intensiﬁed the discussion. There are three principal drivers for an increased
demand for good corporate governance in Germany. First, the institutionaliza-
tion of shareholdings, i.e., the process of accumulation and managing of capital
by professional asset gatherers, is a worldwide trend. In particular, Anglo-Saxon
institutional investors are important as providers of capital and put pressure on
publicly listed companies. This pressure is exercised by either selling shares of
those ﬁrms that do not follow internationally recognized corporate governance
standards (”Wall Street Walk”) or by exercising direct control over the incum-
bent management of the respective ﬁrms (”Voice”). While institutional investors
in Germany have been rather passive in the past in exercising their control rights,
they are becoming increasingly more active.
Second, although economies are becoming increasingly global, ﬁrms with in-
ternational operations are still subject to national corporate governance from a
judicial perspective. Notwithstanding country-speciﬁc legal frameworks, German
ﬁrms need to adopt internationally recognized corporate governance principles in
order to compete eﬃciently with its peers for capital in the global equity markets.
As a result, there is an increasing convergence of corporate governance principles
and practices. Continental European governance systems have already converged
in some areas toward the Anglo-Saxon model, which among institutional investors
is widely regarded as the role model.
Finally, the prominent examples of recent corporate collapses give reasons to
believe that a ﬁrm’s valuation does not only depend on the proﬁtability or the
growth prospects embedded in its business model, but also on the eﬀectiveness of
control mechanisms ensuring that investors’ funds are not expropriated or wasted
in value-decreasing projects.
Increased shareholder activism, tightened rules and regulation, and additional
self-regulation on behalf of market participants in the U.S. and elsewhere are
the result of the conviction that better corporate governance will deliver higher
shareholder value. A recent survey by McKinsey & Company (2000) among
institutional investors has shown that they are willing to pay signiﬁcant premi-
ums for well-governed companies, and that the valuation of a ﬁrm is at least as
dependent on governance practices as it is on ﬁnancial issues. For example, in the
German case investors are willing to pay a 20.2 percent premium for a company
with ”good” governance compared to an otherwise identical company, but with
”bad” governance. From an asset pricing view, a premium on the current stock
2price can only be justiﬁed if the expected rate of return on equity is reduced.
For a given stream of expected dividends, simple valuation models posit that a
ﬁrm’s valuation is inversely related to the required rate of return on its shares.
Therefore, the key question which arises is: Do diﬀerences in corporate gover-
nance translate into diﬀerences in expected rates of return across countries as
well as across companies?
The principal-agent theory is generally considered as the starting point for any
discussion on corporate governance. Appropriate corporate governance mecha-
nisms, while costly themselves, may reduce the prevailing agency problems and
the induced agency costs. In fully integrated world capital markets with no trans-
action or agency costs of external ﬁnance, the traditional Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) predicts that expected returns on equity only depend on the
level of covariance risk with the world market portfolio, and corporate gover-
nance related diﬀerences between countries or individual ﬁrms should have no
explanatory power. However, in the presence of agency problems, the induced
agency costs create a case for diﬀerences in the corporate governance system to be
important for explaining the cross-section of expected stock returns. Lombardo
and Pagano (2002) extend the classic CAPM to include compensation for the
expected costs induced by the agency relationship between insiders and outside
shareholders. In their model, better governance reduces the expected return on
equity to the extent that it reduces shareholders’ monitoring and auditing costs.
The discussion among institutional investors, regulators and market partici-
pants has led to the central hypothesis that better corporate governance reduces
the required rate of return of investors, since it allows them to spend less time
and resources on monitoring management teams. Therefore, in this paper we
argue that a better understanding of the subject can be achieved by combining
the traditional asset pricing approach with the governance approach. Corporate
governance constitutes another risk component from an investor’s perspective.
However, the translation of diﬀerences in the quality of corporate governance
into expected rates of return (1) across countries (in both developed and emerg-
ing market) and (2) across ﬁrms within a single jurisdiction is notoriously diﬃcult
to measure empirically. Apart from theoretical considerations, empirical studies
for German publicly listed ﬁrms speciﬁcally suﬀer from a lack of data. Virtually
all previous empirical studies have analyzed the impact of various legal variables
on the cost of capital in a cross-section of either developed or emerging stock mar-
kets. Depending on the selection of independent and dependent variables, these
studies have found diﬀerent regularities. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) explore this link indirectly by focusing
on the valuation eﬀects of legal and judicial institutions. This is based on the
notion that, for a given stream of expected dividends, a ﬁrm’s valuation is in-
versely related to the required rate of return on its shares. They report that ﬁrms
in more protective legal environments, with better investment opportunities, and
3with higher cash ﬂow ownership of the controlling shareholder have higher Tobin‘s
Qs. In another recent study, Lombardo and Pagano (2000) estimate cost of
capital directly. They document that the cost of capital (if measured with either
the dividend yield or the earnings-price ratio) is negatively related with measures
of protection of shareholder rights. However, it is positively related with general
measures of the quality of legal institutions.
Rather than looking at the legal environment, which aﬀects all ﬁrms equally
within a single jurisdiction, we take a diﬀerent approach and focus on the relation-
ship between a broad ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance rating and an individual
ﬁrm’s expected rate of return in a cross-section of publicly listed ﬁrms in Germany.
The rating includes a wide range of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and, to a large extent, volun-
tary governance proxies related to diﬀerent control mechanisms. The recently
published German Corporate Governance Code presents compulsory statutory
regulations as well as recommendations and suggestions with respect to ”good
and responsible corporate governance” for the management and supervision of
German listed companies. The code is an example of self-commitment by the
corporate sector and, as a soft-law, supplements the so-called ”comply or ex-
plain rule” in the Transparency and Disclosure Law (TransPuG), which recently
entered into eﬀect. Under this rule, any listed ﬁrm unwilling to comply with
the code’s recommendations must issue an explicit declaration in their annual
ﬁnancial accounts each year and explain its decision to the investment public.
This legal setup provides a natural starting point for our empirical analysis.
Speciﬁcally, it views corporate governance as a chance rather than an obligation.
Therefore, the aim of our study is to provide empirical evidence for the German
capital market that better corporate governance leads to lower expected rates of
return on equity and, hence, higher valuation. In a related study, Gompers,
Ishii and Metrick (2001) also look at individual ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with weak shareholder rights are less proﬁtable and have lower sales growth than
their peers. In addition, ﬁrms with weak shareholder rights have higher capital
expenditures and more acquisitions than ﬁrms with strong shareholder rights.
It must also be noted that Germany is of special interest due to its pronounced
diﬀerence to Anglo-Saxon countries in many respects of capital market issues.
Most important, the German Corporate Governance Code explicitly deﬁnes the
aims of corporate governance as follows:1
The purpose of corporate governance is to achieve a responsible, value-
oriented management and control of companies. Corporate gover-
nance rules promote and reinforce the conﬁdence of current and future
shareholders, lenders, employees, business partners and the general
public in national and international markets.
1See the German Corporate Governance Code (2002), www.corporate-governance-code.de.
4This is in strong contrast to the Anglo-Saxon view of corporate governance,
where there is no room for the general public. For example, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) merely refer to ”the risk which ﬁnanciers face in assuring that
their funds are not expropriated or wasted in value-diminishing projects.” Sim-
ilarly, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) deﬁne
corporate governance as ”a set of mechanisms through which outside investors
protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders”. Given this peculiar
institutional environment in Germany, it seems interesting to analyze the re-
lationship between the cost of capital and governance mechanisms, which are
mainly concerned with protecting shareholders as opposed to the general public.
The remainder is as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical framework to
capture the inﬂuence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance on the cost of eq-
uity. Section 3 contains the construction principles and summary statistics of
our survey-based Corporate Governance Rating (CGR). Section 4 explores the
relationship between corporate governance and ﬁrm value, and section 5 presents
the empirical results for the relationship between corporate governance and the
cost of capital. Section 6 concludes.
2 Modelling governance as a reward for risk
In this section we derive a set of testable hypothesis. To measure the relationship
between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance system and the expected rate of
return on equity, we develop a Corporate Governance Rating (CGR) as a proxy
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance quality. The approach to use a broad governance
rating measure can be rationalized in the context of substantial diﬀerences in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance in Germany. There are two factors explaining
these diﬀerences: First, speciﬁc market segment regulation in the past years has
led to more stringent governance principles for the respective market participants,
such as NEMAX ﬁrms. Second, some ﬁrms have pro-actively adopted certain
Anglo-Saxon governance principles, while some of their peers have been rather
reluctant on this subject. This pro-activism may be motivated by strong Anglo-
Saxon shareholdings, frequent need to access international capital markets, or an
existing or planned secondary listing in the United States. This results in a wide
variation of the governance structures across German listed ﬁrms.
In a ﬁrst step, we attempt to answer the question inversely by examining the
relationship between corporate governance and ﬁrm value. Following previous
work by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) and
Black, Jang, and Kim (2002), we relate the market-to-book ratio with the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance rating in a cross-sectional regression. We hy-
pothesize to ﬁnd a positive relationship. However, simple ordinary least square
estimates may suﬀer from endogeneity, i.e., ﬁrms with higher market values could
5be more likely than other ﬁrms to chose better governance structures. To explore
whether good corporate governance practices cause an increase in ﬁrm value, we
also apply two-stage least square regression technique.
In a second step, to analyze the issue of interest more directly, recall the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). It implies a linear relationship between
expected returns and market betas, which completely explains the cross-section
of expected returns. Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), this proposition
can be tested using a cross-sectional regression methodology. Assuming that the
betas are known, the regression model for the t-th cross-section of n assets is:
rt = γ0,t1 + γ1,tβm + t, (1)
where rt is the n × 1 vector of excess returns for time period t, 1 is an n × 1
vector of ones, and βm is the n × 1 vector of CAPM betas. Estimation of (1)
involves two steps. First, given T periods of data, (1) is estimated using OLS
for each t, with t = 1,2,...,T. This yields T estimates of γ0,t and γ1,t. In a
second step, the time series of γ0,t and γ1,t are analyzed. Our setup is a simpliﬁed
version of the speciﬁcation in equation (1), since we only look at a single cross-
section of average historical stock returns. The null hypothesis is that γ0 = 0
(zero intercept) and γ1 > 0 (positive market risk premium).
This approach is useful, because it can easily be adjusted to accommodate
additional risk factors beyond systematic market risk. By adding additional risk
measures, we can examine the hypothesis that beta completely describes the
cross-sectional variation in expected returns. However, in the standard textbook
model with perfect markets, no transaction costs, no agency costs, complete
information and costless enforcements of contracts, institutional issues do not
play any role in determining the expected rate of return on equity. Lombardo
and Pagano (2002) extend the classic CAPM to include compensation for the
expected costs induced by the agency relationship between insiders and outside
shareholders. In their model the institutional setup matters, hence, stronger
protection of minority shareholders’ property rights reduces the expected return
on equity to the extent that it reduces the shareholders’ monitoring and auditing
costs. Similarly, Merton (1987) shows that the expected return on any given
stock is higher the smaller the fraction of investors who are informed about the
stock. Any institutional development that reduces the cost of obtaining reliable
information about a ﬁrm’s true state will reduce the rate of return required by
investors. The goal of our empirical work is to measure whether expected returns
can be explained by a risk factor related to governance risk that aﬀects the
expected monitoring, auditing and other private costs, as put forth in Lombardo
and Pagano (2000) and Lombardo (2000). To this end, let CGR be the
n × 1 vector with elements corresponding to the Corporate Governance Rating,
one can augment (1) to investigate if the quality of ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance has
explanatory power not captured by market beta:
6r = γ01 + γ1βm + γ2CGR + , (2)
where time subscripts are omitted, because we only observe a single cross-
section of corporate governance ratings. r denotes the geometric mean of histor-
ical returns over the sample period from January 1, 1998 to March 1, 2002. The
coeﬃcient γ2 can be regarded as the reward for risk related to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
governance quality. The null hypothesis is that γ0 = 0, γ1 > 0, and γ2 = 0, hence,
ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance has no explanatory power beyond the CAPM beta. It
has been argued that better governance is associated with lower expected rates
of return on equity. However, hypothesizing the direction of the relationship
between CGR and expected rates of return may not be straightforward in the
speciﬁcation in (2). Since we believe that the cost of capital changes when ﬁrms
adopt higher corporate governance standards and that the process is gradual, it
is very diﬃcult to use historical returns to measure changes in the cost of capital.
Using the reasoning in Bekaert and Harvey (2000), an improvement in the
governance measures and the diﬀerent valuation it implies should have a discrete
eﬀect on the price level of stocks and, hence, exploiting information in price lev-
els may be more powerful. In fact, we argue that the relationship is likely to be
positive for average historical returns as the dependent variable in equation (2).
Firms with a high CGR are likely to have improved their governance quality in
the years prior to data collection. By removing certain governance malfunctions,
these ﬁrms are likely to exhibit better performance than their peers with a less
appropriate CGR. The better performance of high CGR ﬁrms can be rationalized
in the context of lower agency costs. Alternatively, referring to simple valuation
models, ﬁrms with a high CGR have low expected returns, which implies a high
current market value. In order to obtain a high valuation today, historical returns
must have been higher for high-CGR ﬁrms.
From an accounting standpoint, a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability is often measured by
valuation ratios, such as the dividend yield and the price-earnings ratio. In equi-
librium, this proﬁtability equals the return that shareholders require to hold the
shares of the company in their portfolio. Adjusting for diﬀerences in growth, Er-
runza and Miller (1998), Lombardo and Pagano (2000) and Bekaert and
Harvey (2000) use the dividend yield as a measure of the cost of capital. This
has the advantage that it can be directly observed and is a stationary variable.
From the static Gordon model we know that:
Dt+1
Pt

i
= ρi − gi, (3)
where (Dt+1/Pt)i is next years expected dividend (at time t + 1) divided by
the current stock price (at time t) of ﬁrm i, ρi denotes its (constant) expected rate
of return, and gi is the steady-state growth rate of ﬁrm earnings. Accordingly,
7holding growth rates constant, high (low) dividend yield ﬁrms have high (low)
expected rates of returns.2 Therefore, the dividend yield is intricately linked
to the cost of equity capital in the standard textbook valuation model. Under
the CAPM, ρi depends only on the ﬁrm’s covariance with the market portfolio.
If in addition the required rate of return depends on our survey-constructed
governance rating, the augmented model for the cross-section of expected returns
is as follows:
D
P
= γ01 + γ1βm + γ2CGR + γ3g + , (4)
where D/P denotes the vector of average dividend yields during the sample
period from January 1, 1998 to March 1, 2002, and is g the vector with elements
corresponding to growth rates in earnings (assuming that payout ratios are con-
stant). We hypothesize that γ2 < 0, hence, companies with better ﬁrm-speciﬁc
governance (high CGR) exhibit lower dividend yields. Alternatively, in a strict
asset pricing context, high CGR ﬁrms have higher valuations and lower cost of
capital (correcting for diﬀerences in future earnings growth). Clearly, the tradi-
tional version of the CAPM posits that γ2 = 0, i.e., there is no systematic risk
measure beyond market risk.
Similarly, using price-earnings ratios, the empirical model to estimate the
relationship between ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance and cost of equity capital is as
follows:
P
E
= γ01 + γ1βm + γ2CGR + γ3g + , (5)
where P/E denotes the vector of price-earnings ratios at the end of the sample
period, i.e., as of March 1, 2002.3 Following our central proposition, we expect
that γ2 > 0, hence, companies with better ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance (high CGR)
exhibit higher price-earnings ratios. Again, high CGR ﬁrms have higher valua-
tions and lower cost of capital, as couched in terms of higher price-earnings ratios
(correcting for diﬀerences in earnings growth).
3 Data description
3.1 Constructing a German governance score
The few existing studies on the relationship between governance and expected
rates of return, such as Lombardo and Pagano (2000) and Lombardo (2000),
2Campbell (1991) derives a more general model with time-varying expected returns. How-
ever, the main intuition remains valid.
3We think that monthly averages of price-earnings ratios over the sample period are inap-
propriate, because during the internet bubble earnings expectations were exaggerated for most
companies.
8focus on the legal environment as the independent variable in a cross-section of
countries. This is not surprising, given that the majority of research reﬂects an
Anglo-Saxon approach to corporate governance, which puts the legal environment
into the center stage of the discussion. In the United States, with traditionally
high dispersion of ownership, the primary methods to solve the agency prob-
lems are the legal protection of minority investors, the use of boards as monitors
of senior management, as well as an active market for corporate control. As
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001) argue, the strength of these methods is
determined by securities regulation, corporate law and bylaws, charter provisions,
and other rules. Taken together, these regulations, laws, and provisions ”deﬁne
the power-sharing relationship between investors and managers”.4 In Germany
the typical approach to corporate governance is concentrated ownership of large
investors, typically banks. In this case, outside (smaller) investors face the risk
of expropriation in the form of wealth transfers to larger shareholders. Conse-
quently, a large part of the existing research focuses on the relationship between
ownership structure and ﬁrm performance. However, the results of these studies
diverge substantially and depend strongly on the sample, the sample period and
the methodology used.5
The objective in this paper is to provide evidence for the hypothesized rela-
tionship between governance and expected rates of return within a single jurisdic-
tion. Rather than looking at the regulatory environment or ownership structure,
which aﬀects all ﬁrms similarly within a single jurisdiction, we focus on the re-
lationship between a large set of governance proxies and expected returns in a
broad cross-section of German listed ﬁrms. Our approach follows Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2001), who focus on the relationship between a large set
of governance provisions related to takeover defenses and shareholder rights and
a ﬁrm’s long-term performance. Adopting a one-country approach also avoids
the classic challenges of international cross-sectional studies. In order to postu-
late a relationship between corporate governance, expected returns, and other
performance parameters for German listed companies, we obtain a broad mea-
sure which quantiﬁes ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance. We identify relevant
governance structures to proxy for ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance risk. The
proxies predominantly capture ex ante preventive governance mechanisms, which
have the potential to mitigate hidden information as well as moral hazard. They
can be initiated and implemented by a ﬁrm’s decision makers. Together, the
full set of proxies is assumed to indicate the governance quality of the respec-
tive ﬁrm. In total, we gather 30 governance proxies divided into ﬁve categories:
4See Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001), p. 4.
5For a survey of related results see Lehmann and Weigand (2000), B¨ ohmer (2000), and
Gugler (2001). For example, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) ﬁnd that for listed and non-
listed ﬁrms ownership concentration aﬀects proﬁtability signiﬁcantly negatively, while bank
ownership improves performance.
9(1) corporate governance commitment, (2) shareholders’ rights, (3) transparency,
(4) management and supervisory board matters, and (5) auditing. While the
notion of a broad governance rating can also be found in Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick (2001), our approach does not build on diﬀerences in federal and state
law regulation and/or corporate provisions at a ﬁrm level, but on a variety of
voluntary corporate governance proxies.6 This reﬂects the common belief that
implementing adequate governance structures should be understood as a chance,
as opposed to an obligation by corporate decision makers.
To qualify for an inclusion into the corporate governance rating, each proxy (i)
must refer to a governance element that is not (yet) legally required and (ii) needs
to be considered international market practice from an investor’s perspective. A
useful source to identify relevant governance proxies is the list of recommen-
dations and suggestions contained in the German Corporate Governance Code
(GCGC). It represents essential capital markets law for the management and su-
pervision of German listed ﬁrms as well as recommendations and suggestions de-
rived from internationally recognized standards of ”good corporate governance”.
If ﬁrms deviate from recommendations, they must disclose it in their annual ﬁ-
nancial statements. This enables companies to reﬂect sector- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
requirements. This ”comply-or-explain” rule is intended to ”contribute to more
ﬂexibility and more self-regulation in the German corporate constitution”. In
contrast, ﬁrms can deviate from suggestions without disclosing it. The code has
become eﬀective as of February, 26, 2002. Of the 30 proxies included in our
corporate governance rating (CGR), the majority represents recommendations of
the governance code. Only a few recommendations, e.g., those related to spe-
ciﬁc management and supervisory board matters, have been disregarded in the
questionnaire. We anticipated the response rate to be rather low, because the re-
cipients of the questionnaire either would not know the answers or be unwilling to
respond to them for conﬁdentiality reasons. The other governance proxies we use
have been derived from the DVFA German Corporate Governance Scorecard7,
from CalPERS German Market Principles, and from the Deminor Corporate
Governance Checklist.8 The Scorecard is a standard evaluation methodology for
corporate governance of listed ﬁrms developed by the DVFA. The complete set
of proxies has been tested on plausibility from a legal and regulatory perspective
by Deutsche B¨ orse AG.9
A detailed questionnaire with all thirty governance proxies was sent out to
all ﬁrms in the four principal market segments in Germany: DAX 30, MDAX,
6In Germany, unlike in the U.S., there is no state (”Bundesland”) speciﬁc regulation related
to corporate governance.
7DVFA is the German Society of Investment Analysis and Asset Management.
8Deminor is a governance consulting company based in Brussels.
9The questions have also been checked by Credit Suisse First Boston from an institutional
investor’s perspective to ensure that they reﬂect the overall market opinion.
10Table 1: Survey response ratios by market segment
DAX 30 MDAX NEMAX SMAX All
Responses (sample size) 14 33 13 31 91
Relevant population 30 70 42 111 253
Response ratio 46.7% 47.1% 31.0% 27.9% 36.0%
NEMAX 50, and SMAX, comprising in total 253 ﬁrms.10 The survey was supple-
mented by veriﬁcation of the collected data on the basis of annual and quarterly
reports, company charters, and web pages, where necessary. This is to ensure
that the answers are not overstated by the participating ﬁrms.11 The question-
naire was sent out in February 2002, and the data collection was completed at the
end of March 2002. Since the entire relevant population has been contacted via
the survey, the scope of the data collection can be regarded as highly extensive
in the German stock market. Firms outside the qualiﬁed market segments are
considered to be less relevant for this empirical exercise. This is because institu-
tional investors are less likely to invest in small cap ﬁrms outside the four market
segments due to certain investment requirements, such as minimum liquidity and
stock turnover levels or size (in terms of sales and market capitalization). Since
it is assumed that our corporate governance rating acts as a proxy for the es-
timated monitoring and auditing costs incurred by institutional investors, little
institutional ownership levels would make it diﬃcult to maintain this assumption.
The response ratio of the survey exceeded 30 percent across all market segments,
except for the SMAX segment, where the ratio was slightly below 30 percent.
The survey as a whole had a response ratio of 36 percent. Table 1 shows the
break-down of the response ratios by market segments.12
To measure ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance quality, we choose a broad Corporate
Governance Rating (CGR) as our risk measure. We suspect that cross-sectional
regressions of ﬁrm performance on single mechanisms, such as board structure
or managerial pay, as shown in numerous studies, may be misleading. The con-
struction of the CGR is kept tractable. First, the distinction in the governance
quality to derive the CGR is straightforward in almost all cases. Generally, a
higher acceptance level of a proxy variable indicates an active move by the ﬁrm’s
management to have improved the corporate governance system. Second, for
each ﬁrm, 25 basis points are added for each acceptance level of the respective
proxy in a ﬁve-scale answering range. Higher acceptance levels can be interpreted
10The questionnaire is available from the authors on request.
11As will be shown below, the distribution of the corporate governance rating across the
sample shows that the recipients of the questionnaire did not hesitate to give low ratings to
their own governance.
12Eight NEMAX ﬁrms have been excluded from the original population due to delisting.
11as a better ﬁrm speciﬁc corporate governance. Finally, the CGR is the sum of
the basis points per ﬁrm across all proxies, ranging from 0 to 30. The maximum
score of 30 indicates an outstanding standard of ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate gover-
nance. While an equal weighting scheme for these proxies makes no attempt to
accurately reﬂect the relative importance of the individual proxies, this approach
has the advantage of being transparent and allows easy interpretations.
Having constructed the CGR in this manner, the key question is: How can
diﬀerences in the CGR translate into perceived risk for shareholders? As argued
above, the investor’s risk exposure against expected insider expropriation deter-
mines the level of agency costs in the form of required monitoring and auditing
eﬀorts. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc CGR, because it is based on a large set of governance
variables, can act as a proxy for the estimated monitoring and auditing costs
incurred by outside shareholders. The higher the CGR, the lower the required
monitoring and auditing costs. We hypothesize that the CGR constitutes a proxy
for the risk portion beyond covariance risk with a broad market index, relating to
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance system. Unfortunately, the cross-sectional analysis is
dictated by the availability of corporate governance data. As there is no German
corporate governance database available tracking selected proxies backwards, we
cannot quantify the CGR for past years and conduct panel regression tests.
To measure the hypothesized relationship between the CGR and the expected
rate of return on equity, we face the fundamental problem that expectations are
not directly observable. To proxy for the return on equity, we rely on three
diﬀerent measures: (1) historical stock returns (RI) and fundamental valuation
measures, such as (2) dividend yields (DY ) and (3) price-earnings ratios (PE).
Speciﬁcally, we draw monthly total returns of the sample ﬁrms over the period
from January 1, 1998 to March 1, 2002 (50 months). The total return shows a
theoretical growth in value of a share holding over a speciﬁed period, assuming
that dividends are reinvested to purchase additional units of an equity at the clos-
ing price applicable on the ex-dividend date.13 We calculate monthly geometric
mean returns for all ﬁrms during the sample period. In addition, we also gather
annual dividend yields and price-earnings ratios at the end of the sample period
for all ﬁrms. The dividend yield expresses the dividend per share as a percentage
of the current share price (Datastream datatype: DY). It is based on an antici-
pated annual dividend and excludes special or once-oﬀ dividends. It includes the
tax credit applicable to domestic investors. Again, we use the mean of annual
dividend yields over the sample period. The price-earnings ratio is deﬁned as the
price for a particular stock divided by consensus forecast earnings per share. To
be precise, to measure earnings per share we take a simple average of earnings
13Gross dividends are used where available and the calculation ignores tax and reinvestment
charges.
12forecasts for the current ﬁnancial year and the next ﬁnancial year (Datastream
datatypes: PE1 and PE2).14
To measure the true relationship between our corporate governance rating and
the expected rate of return, control variables must be included into the regression
analysis. When total returns in the secondary market are used to proxy for ex-
pected returns, we control for non-diversiﬁable risk. In addition, dividend yields
and price-earnings ratios must be purged from diﬀerences in expected growth.
Accordingly, for each ﬁrm the beta is estimated over the sample period from Jan-
uary 1, 1998 to March 1, 2002, using the DAX 100 index as the market portfolio.
In order to proxy for diﬀerent growth rates, we use forward-looking growth rates,
which are calculated as the mean of consensus expected earnings per share growth
rates and historical growth rates. Expected earnings per share growth rates are
derived from IBES expected forward year earnings per share divided by the IBES
expected current year earnings per share (Datastream datatypes: EPS2 divided
by EPS1). Historical growth rates are derived from either total sales, total asset
growth rates or the mean of both (depending on data availability) over the past
ﬁve ﬁnancial years.15
As already noted above, we choose a sample period of 50 months, from Jan-
uary 1, 1998 to March 1, 2002. Since no time-varying CGRs are available for
German ﬁrms, we have to assume a constant governance rating during the sam-
ple period. We implicitly argue that investors have used the respective value of
the governance rating to form average expectations for monitoring, auditing and
other private costs over the sample period. Clearly, this assumption is not per-
fectly accurate, but we think not critical. This is because in Germany governance
issues have received broader attention only recently, and the public discussion has
not reached its peak yet. This might ensure that the relative importance of gover-
nance across the sample of ﬁrms remained unchanged during the sample period.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
3.2.1 Characteristics of the corporate governance rating
In this section we provide some descriptive statistics for the Corporate Gover-
nance Score (CGR) as well as for some selected individual governance variables,
such as board structure and auditing standards. To start with, ﬁgure 1 shows
the sample distribution of our Corporate Governance Rating (CGR). To simplify,
the CGR has been rounded to the nearest integer (a CGR of 11.25 is reported
as a CGR of 11).16 The histogram shows that the CGR over the sample of 91
14All values for PE above 70 are excluded.
15The mean is used when data for both sales and total asset growth is available from Datas-
tream. Otherwise, historical growth refers to either sales or total asset growth, depending which
data type is available. Both expected earnings growth and historical growth are adjusted and
exclude values beyond 50% and -50%.
16We do not use rounded CGRs in the regression analysis below.
13Table 2: Summary statistics of CGR by market segment
DAX 30 MDAX NEMAX SMAX All
Minimum 18.5 13.3 17.8 8.5 8.5
Mean 22.6 19.4 21.7 16.8 19.3
Median 22.3 19.3 21.0 17.0 19.8
Maximum 27.2 25.8 25.8 22.8 27.3
Standard deviation 2.6 3.4 2.2 3.8 3.9
ﬁrms is slightly skewed to the left. More than 40% of the sample (hence, 38
ﬁrms) have a CGR between 20 and 23. It also shows that the governance proxies
are adequately selected to reach a wide distribution of CGRs across the sample.
This mitigates a possible selection bias in our survey. Given that ﬁrms truthfully
reveal their governance patterns, the potential bias that only ﬁrms with good
governance participate in the survey might not be too severe.
[Insert Figure 1: Distribution of the CGR]
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of CGRs by market segment. A closer
look at the individual market segments reveals that DAX ﬁrms exhibit the highest
CGRs, followed by NEMAX, MDAX and SMAX ﬁrms. The leading position of
DAX ﬁrms is not surprising. In addition, the high governance ratings of NEMAX
ﬁrms relative to the two other market segments can be rationalized in the context
of more stringent regulation at the Neuer Markt.17 While SMAX ﬁrms must
adhere to certain disclosure and auditing obligations, they are rather reluctant
to adopt governance standards going beyond regulation. Generally, this is due to
the costs involved and less pronounced investor pressure.
Figure 2 shows the rating of governance proxies by the ﬁve categories, as de-
ﬁned above: (1) governance commitment, (2) minority rights, (3) transparency,
(4) board matters, and (5) auditing. It becomes clear that governance proxies
related to the ﬁrms’ transparency and auditing standards have been given the
highest ratings, while those related to general governance commitment and board
matters exhibit the lowest ratings. This is because probably disclosure and audit-
ing standards are easier to implement and enforce from a regulatory perspective.
17Trading on Neuer Markt is not organized under public law like the trading on the Oﬃcial
Quotation (Amtlicher Handel) or on the Regulated Market (Geregelter Markt). Instead, it
operates as an independent trading segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and trading is
organized under private law (modelled on NASDAQ). This structure allows the Deutsche B¨ orse
to construct rules and regulations which are more stringent than those of public law market
segments. Admission to the Regulated Market is only one of the prerequisites which Neuer
Markt applicants have to meet.
14In contrast, particularly board structures lack Anglo-Saxon governance character
due to the German co-determination regime and cross-shareholder representation.
[Insert Figure 2: Rating of governance proxies by categories]
Figure 3 shows that the CGRs may vary across industry sectors, referring to
the Dow Jones EURO STOXX industry classiﬁcation. Firms in the insurance,
chemical, and energy sectors tend to show high CGRs, while ﬁrms in the basis
resources, retail and utility suppliers sectors have rather lower ratings. However,
this analysis can be distorted, since each of the above mentioned sectors is rep-
resented by only a few sample ﬁrms. If the analysis is reduced to those sectors
representing at least four ﬁrms, we observe that ﬁrms in the healthcare and bank
sector tend to show higher CGRs as opposed to ﬁrms in the traditionally more
domestic oriented sectors, such as industrial goods and services retail or utility
supplier. Figure 4 shows the number of ﬁrms by industry sectors. The better
governance standard of some sectors can be rationalized, among others, through
the need to access the capital markets more frequently or even an existing listing
in an Anglo-Saxon country.
[Insert Figure 3: Mean CGR by industry sector]
[Insert Figure 4: Number of ﬁrms by industry sectors]
Figure 5 presents the application and practice of accounting principles by
market segments. As expected, about two-thirds of all DAX ﬁrms in the sam-
ple follow internationally recognized accounting principles. Regulation at Neuer
Markt requires all NEMAX ﬁrms to submit their annual and quarterly reports
either under IAS or US-GAAP. The situation is reverse in the MDAX and SMAX
segments. More than 50% of the sample ﬁrms in both segments still follow Ger-
man accounting principles.
[Insert Figure 5: Accounting standards by market segments]
Next, we report some details on governance characteristics which are often
subject of empirical studies: board size and board independence. Table 3 shows
that DAX ﬁrms have the largest boards, followed by MDAX ﬁrms. The wide
discrepancy between minimum and maximum, especially in the case of MDAX
and SMAX ﬁrms, marks the potential for further board size reduction. Finally,
table 4 shows the relative weight of supervisory board members owing more
than 5 percent of a ﬁrm’s share capital. The rationale behind this analysis is
that supervisory boards staﬀed by members representing more than 5 percent
of the share capital are generally considered less independent. While for DAX
ﬁrms 7 percent of the equity representatives are regarded non-independent, the
15Table 3: Number of supervisory board members by segment
DAX 30 MDAX NEMAX SMAX
Minimum 6.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Mean 17.7 12.5 5.8 6.4
Median 20.0 12.0 6.0 6.0
Maximum 21.0 21.0 9.0 20.0
Table 4: Percentage of supervisory board members with >5% of share capital
DAX 30 MDAX NEMAX SMAX
Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0%
Mean 7% 19% 9% 34%
Median 5% 10% 0% 33%
Maximum 19% 67% 67% 100%
numbers are 19 and 34 percent for MDAX and SMAX ﬁrms, respectively. This
can be rationalized with relatively small free-ﬂoats compared to DAX ﬁrms and
concentrated ownership by founding families or ﬁnancial/strategic shareholders.
3.2.2 Univariate analysis
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the relationship between our CGRs and
several ﬁnancial measures as well as fundamental valuation ratios. MV denotes
the average monthly market capitalization, GROWTH measures the average of
adjusted sales and asset growth over the past ﬁve years18, and RI is the geometric
mean of monthly stock returns. All variables are measured over the sample period
from January 1, 1998 to March 1, 2002. DY is the mean of annual dividend yields,
PE is the price-earnings ratio at the end of the sample period19, and MTBV is
the mean of monthly market-to-book ratios.20
The second column of the table shows the correlation coeﬃcients between
each of these variables with our survey-based CGR. For all measures, except
for GROWTH, the correlation coeﬃcients with our corporate governance proxy
are signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms with better governance tend to be large and
18Datastream datatypes: 104 and 392.
19Recall, to measure earnings per share we take a simple average of earnings forecasts for the
current ﬁnancial year and the next ﬁnancial year (Datastream datatypes: PE1 and PE2). All
values for PE above 70 are excluded.
20All negative values for MTBV and values above 15 are excluded.
16Table 5: CGRs and ﬁnancial characteristics
Correlation Mean principal Mean agent
with CGR portfolio ﬁrms portfolio ﬁrms Diﬀerence
MV (EURm) 0.27∗∗∗ 9891 539 9352∗∗∗
GROWTH 0.14 17% 12% 5%
RI 0.36∗∗∗ 0.30% -2.03% 2.33%∗∗∗
DY -0.24∗∗ 1.5 2.7 -1.4%∗∗
PE 0.23∗∗ 21.3 15.3 5.1∗∗
MTBV 0.31∗∗∗ 5.2 3.4 2.7∗
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%/5%/1% level.
receive high valuations relative to their fundamental measures. Consistent with
the general notion that high valuations are the result from high past returns, the
(positive) correlation between historical returns the CGR is signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
Following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001), we pay special attention
to two portfolios. First, the principal portfolio is composed of all ﬁrms with the
highest governance quality, with CGR > 21. Second, ﬁrms with the weakest gov-
ernance quality, with CGR < 18, are placed into an agent portfolio.21 Therefore,
the third and fourth columns give the means for these same variables within the
principal and agent portfolios, respectively. To reiterate, the principal portfolio
includes the ﬁrms with the strongest governance structure (CGR > 21). The
agent portfolio comprises the ﬁrms with the weakest governance structure (CGR
< 18). The portfolio returns are all equally-weighted. Finally, the last column
shows the diﬀerences in the means of all variables between the two portfolios.
As could be expected, there are marked diﬀerences between the two portfolios.
With respect to past returns, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrms in the principal portfolio
had on average 2.3 percent higher monthly returns than the agency portfolio.
Consistent with this observation, the the ﬁrms in the principal portfolio exhibit
signiﬁcantly lower dividend yields and higher price-earnings ratios. While these
results from a univariate analysis are interesting, a multivariate regression anal-
ysis is clearly needed to control for ﬁnancial risk and/or growth characteristics,
before more robust conclusions can be drawn on the relationship between the
CGRs and expected returns. This analysis is postponed until section 4.
21The breakpoints are chosen on the basis of the distribution of our survey-based CGR, as
shown in section 3.2.
173.2.3 Portfolio buy-and-hold returns
If corporate governance matters for ﬁrm performance and this relationship is
fully incorporated by the market, then a stock price should quickly adjust to
any changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance. This is the central notion of all event
studies in empirical research. If such a reaction occurs, then expected returns on
the stock would be unaﬀected beyond the event window. However, if governance
matters, but is not incorporated immediately into stock prices, then realized
returns should diﬀer systematically. In this subsection, we analyze whether such
a systematic diﬀerence exists.
As shown above, the mean returns of the agent (CGR < 18) and the principal
(CGR >21) portfolios are diﬀerent at the 5% level of signiﬁcance. We calculate
buy-and-hold returns for these two portfolios over the sample period. If one had
invested 1 Euro in the agency portfolio on January 1, 1998 (beginning of the
sample period), it would have diminished to 88 cents by March 1, 2002 (end of
sample period). In contrast, an investment of 1 Euro in the principal portfolio
would have grown to 1.41 Euro over the same time period. This equals to an
annualized return of -3.1 percent for the agency portfolio and 8.6 percent for the
principal portfolio, a diﬀerence of roughly 12 percent per year. Figure 6 displays
the buy-and-hold returns for the two portfolios as well as the DAX 100 index
over the sample period.
[Insert Figure 6: Rolling buy-and-hold returns (1998 - 2002)]
Figure 7 exhibits the diﬀerence between the rolling average buy-and-hold re-
turns of the principal and the agent portfolio, denoted as PMA (principal minus
agent) return, compared with the broader market index return.
[Insert Figure 7: Rolling abnormal return and market return]
Clearly, the strong outperformance of the Principal Portfolio over the period
from January 1999 to April 2000 can be rationalized in the context of the hype
valuations on Neuer Markt. Since the CGRs for NEMAX ﬁrms tend to be high
due to the enhanced governance regulation for this market segment, as illus-
trated in table 2, several of these ﬁrms have entered into the principal portfolio.
To avoid any biases, we exclude the NEMAX ﬁrms from the principal portfolio
and compute the return spread between the two portfolios in ﬁgure 8. Evidently,
an ”adjusted” principal portfolio has still performed better than the agent port-
folio and the DAX 100 market index. However, the annualized return diﬀerence
between the two portfolios shrinks from 12 percent to 8 percent. Interestingly, the
outperformance of the adjusted principal portfolio even persisted in bear market
periods, such as between August and October 1998 (Russian crisis) as well as in
periods of external shocks, such as after 11 September 2001.
18[Insert Figure 8: Rolling buy-and-hold returns (NM adjusted)]
It is obvious that the magnitude of buy-and-hold returns is determined by
the chosen starting point as well as the length of the sample period. We think
that a ﬁve year period is a reasonable compromise with regards to the length
of the holding period. In addition, calculating buy-and-hold returns during two
subperiods in order to reﬂect a bull (1/98 - 3/00) and a bear market period (4/00
- 3/02) reveals a similar picture. Figure 9 shows that over the two subperiods
the principal portfolio outperforms the agent portfolio. However, during the bear
market one can observe a clear Neuer Markt eﬀect. The principal portfolio out-
performs the agent portfolio only after excluding ﬁrms on Neuer Markt. During
this latter period, investors would have been better oﬀ holding the market index.
[Insert Figure 9: Rolling buy-and-hold Returns over subperiods]
What can explain this disparity in performance? To answer this question,
we explore whether a rational asset pricing model can capture these return dif-
ferences. There is a large amount of empirical evidence that, in addition to
market risk (beta), other ﬁrm characteristics, such as a ﬁrm’s market capital-
ization (size), book-to-market characteristics (or other value characteristics), or
immediate past returns (momentum) provide signiﬁcant explanatory power for
the cross-section of expected returns.22 If the agent portfolio diﬀers signiﬁcantly
from the principal portfolio in these characteristics, then these diﬀerences may
explain at least part of the diﬀerence in raw returns. We apply the three-factor
model originally proposed by Fama and French (1993). Speciﬁcally, to account
for the diﬀerences in style or riskiness of the the agent and principal portfolio,
we estimate the following time series regression:
PMAt = α + β1 · RMRFt + β2 · SMBt + β3 · HMLt + t, (6)
where PMAt is the return diﬀerence between the principal and the agency
portfolio in month t, RMRFt is the month t value-weighted market return minus
the risk-free rate, and SMBt (small minus big) and HMLt (high minus low)
are the month t returns of factor mimicking portfolios designed to capture size
and book-to-market characteristics, respectively. Although there is an ongoing
debate about whether these factors are proxies for risk, we take no position on
this issue and simply view the three-factor model as a method of performance
attribution.23 Thus, we interpret the estimated intercept coeﬃcient, α, as the
22See Basu (1977) (price-earnings ratio), Banz (1981) (size), Fama and French (1993) (size
and book-to-market), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) (several value measures),
and Jegadeesh andTitman (1993) (momentum), among many others.
23See Daniel and Titman (1997) for an opposing view.
19Table 6: Three-factor model (principal minus agent)
Variable Coeﬃcient S.D. t-statistic Prob.
HML 0.05 0.07 0.67 0.5057
RMRF 0.41 0.12 3.33 0.0017
SMB -0.38 0.16 -2.39 0.0209
α 1.37 0.57 2.38 0.0217
R-square 0.58
abnormal return in excess of what could have been achieved by passive invest-
ments in the factors. The intercept can be interpreted as the abnormal return
on an investment strategy that buys the principal portfolio and sells short the
agency portfolio.
Table 6 reports the regression results of the three-factor model in equation
(6) over the sample period from January 1, 1998 to March 1, 2002 (50 months).
The dependent variable is the monthly diﬀerence between the returns on the
principal and the agent portfolios, denoted as PMA (principal minus agent). The
explanatory variables are RMRF, HML, and SMB. RMRF is the return on the
DAX 100 market index in excess of the 10-years Bund yield. SMB constitutes the
monthly return diﬀerences between the DAX 30 and SDAX 100 market indices.
HML denotes the monthly return diﬀerences between the MSCI growth and
value indices for Germany. These indices use price-to-book (MTBV ) ratios to
divide the standard MSCI country index for Germany into two subindices, value
and growth. All securities are classiﬁed as either value securities (low MTBV ) or
growth securities (high MTBV ), relative to the MSCI country index for Germany.
The regression results show that the coeﬃcients of RMRF and SMB enter with
a positive and negative sign, respectively, and they are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level of signiﬁcance.24 The negative sign of SMB is consistent with our ﬁnding
in table 5 that high-CGR ﬁrms tend to be large ﬁrms. If RMRF, SMB, and
HML stand for proxies of systematic risk factors, the return diﬀerence between
the principal and the agency portfolios (PMA) can be explained through market
risk and the size eﬀect, but only partly. This is because the (intercept) alpha
can be interpreted as the abnormal return, controlling for market risk and style
diﬀerences. Our estimate for the alpha is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-
percent level and amounts to 137 basis points per month, or 16.4 percent per
year. This is similar in magnitude to the annualized abnormal return from the
buy-and-hold strategy analyzed above.
24This result is in line with the results in Gompers, Iishi, and Metrick (2002).
20Table 7: Corporate governance and ﬁrm value (OLS)
Variable Coeﬃcient S.D. t-statistic Prob.
Constant 5.64 2.37 2.38 0.0212
CGR 0.28 0.11 2.67 0.0101
Growth 0.01 0.02 0.44 0.6603
log(Assets) -0.52 0.16 -3.27 0.0019
R-square 0.156
4 Corporate governance and ﬁrm value
4.1 Simple regression results
Figure 10 shows a scatterplot for an ordinary least square regression of the cor-
porate governance rating (CGR) against the market-to-book ratio. In line with
our general notion, there is a positive relationship, as indicated by the upward
sloping line of best ﬁt. Firms with higher governance ratings exhibit higher ﬁrm
valuations, measured by higher market-to-book ratios. The estimated coeﬃcient
on the governance rating is positive and signiﬁcant, with a p-value of 0.0123.
[Insert ﬁgure 10: Corporate governance rating and market-to-book ratio]
In table 7, the market-to-book ratio is regressed on the governance rating
using ordinary least square. Following Shin and Stulz (2000) and Gompers,
Ishii and Metrick (2001), we use the log of book asset value and the average of
sales and asset growth as the basic controlling variables.25 The results show that
the coeﬃcient on the governance index is signiﬁcant and economically meaningful.
An increase in the corporate governance index by 3 points results in an increase
of market capitalization by 2.8 percent of the company’s book asset value. Notice
that the corporate governance rating (CGR) ranges from 0 to 30. Surprisingly,
growth turns out to be insigniﬁcant.
4.2 Two-stage least square regression results
The question remains whether good corporate governance causes higher ﬁrm
valuations. As argued by Black, Jang, and Kim (2002), an important issue in
the analysis above is endogeneity. If endogeneity of the variable CGR is indeed a
problem, we could not make an assessment on the causal connection. Firms with
higher market values could simply be more likely to choose better governance
25Due to data limitations the sample size is reduced to 55 ﬁrms.
21structures. Speciﬁcally, they can do so for two possible reasons. First, ﬁrm
insiders believe that better governance structures will further raise ﬁrm value.
Accordingly, there is a causal relationship, but ordinary least square coeﬃcients
will overstate the actual connection. Second, ﬁrms adopt good governance to
signal that insiders behave well. In this case, there may be no causal connection
at all. The signal of management quality, and not the ﬁrm’s governance practices,
aﬀect ﬁrm value.
There are standard econometric techniques for addressing possible endogene-
ity. All of them require identifying a good instrument. An appropriate instrument
must satisfy two conditions. First, it is correlated with the independent variable
of interest (corporate governance rating). Second, it is uncorrelated with the
error term, i.e., it is correlated with the dependent variable of interest (market-
to-book ratio) only through the governance rating. To control for endogeneity,
we use two-stage least square regression technique to estimate the coeﬃcients. A
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is in the DAX or NEMAX
segments, and 0 otherwise, is chosen to be the exogenous variable that is suppos-
edly correlated with corporate governance, but that does not appear in the ﬁrm
value equation. There are three reasons underlying this particular choice of the
instrument variable. First, the results in table 2 indicate that the segment of the
German stock exchange is an important determinant of corporate governance.
Second, and more important, because ﬁrms in the NEMAX segment are obliged
to adopt higher corporate governance standards by the German stock exchange,
the dummy variable can safely be regarded as exogenous. Firms have no choice
but to meet the listing requirements. In addition, because they are globally ori-
ented in their activities, DAX blue-chip ﬁrms experience exogenous pressure to
adopt internationally recognized governance practices. Third, when asset value is
also controlled for, it is hard to imagine that the dummy will have any additional
explanatory power over ﬁrm value other than trough strengthened governance.
Following Stock and Watson (2002), we use the ﬁrst-stage F-statistic to
check the information content contained in the segment dummy.26 Speciﬁcally,
the ﬁrst-stage F-statistic is the F-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the
coeﬃcients on the instruments are equal to zero in the ﬁrst stage of two-stage
least square. As a rule of thumb, when there is a single endogenous regressor,
a ﬁrst stage F-statistic less than 10 indicates that the instrument is weak. In
this case, two-stage least square estimators are biased, and the t-statistics are
unreliable. The ﬁrst-stage involves a regression of the CGR on a constant, the
segment dummy variable, and all exogenous variables (i.e., growth and asset size).
The F-statistic of a Wald-test for the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the
constant and the segment dummy are jointly equal to zero strongly rejects (with
F-statistic>500). This indicates that the problem of weak instruments should
not be an issue in our case.
26See Stock and Watson (2002), p. 350.
22Table 8: Corporate governance and ﬁrm value (2SLS)
Variable Coeﬃcient S.D. t-statistic Prob.
Constant -4.50 6.10 -0.74 0.4644
CGR 1.25 0.48 2.59 0.0124
Growth 0.01 0.04 0.27 0.7869
log(Assets) -1.15 0.39 -2.94 0.0050
R-square 0.376
Table 8 shows the two-stage least square results for our corporate governance
rating (CGR). The R-square refers to the second stage regression, using the
ﬁtted values of CGR. Compared to the results in table 7, the explanatory power
increases considerably (from 15.6 to 37.6 percent). Further, the coeﬃcient on the
governance rating is much larger than that estimated by ordinary least square.
The coeﬃcient of 1.25 on CGR is signiﬁcant at the 2 percent level and is ﬁve times
larger than the ordinary least square estimate in table 7. This result is consistent
with causation running from good governance to higher ﬁrm value, as measured
by the market-to-book ratio. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is very large from
an economic point of views; it implies that an increase in the corporate governance
rating by 3 points results in an increase of market capitalization by 12.5 percent
of the company’s book asset value. Recall again, the governance rating (CGR)
ranges from 0 to 30. In contrast, this result does not support either the signaling
hypothesis (ﬁrms signal quality by adopting good governance rules) or opposite
causality (more highly valued ﬁrm adopt better governance rules). As before,
the average of sales and asset growth is insigniﬁcant. Overall, the results conﬁrm
the crucial predictions of the theory, namely that poor corporate governance is
penalized with lower valuations. This holds not only on a country-level, as shown
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002), but also for
a cross-section of ﬁrms within the same (German) jurisdiction.
5 Corporate governance rating and expected re-
turn on equity
5.1 Corporate governance and historical stock returns
In this subsection, we use historical stock returns on secondary markets in Ger-
many to measure the relationship between the CGR and the expected rate of
return on equity. This assumes that historical returns are good proxies for ex-
pected rates of return. In the presence of agency costs, expected returns on equity
23may include a risk component not related to the beta of a stock. Similar to the
rationale in cross-country studies, diﬀerences in expected stock returns may also
arise in equilibrium for a domestic cross-section if shareholders’ auditing and le-
gal costs diﬀer systematically when investing in diﬀerent ﬁrms. Our approach
explores whether a variation in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance system can account
for some of the diﬀerences in the rate of return on equity. We investigate whether
the CGR has explanatory power for the expected rate of return in a cross-section
of ﬁrms within a single jurisdiction.
However, the relationship between the CGRs and expected returns may sim-
ply be the result of diﬀerent patterns of riskiness across ﬁrms. It could be that
diﬀerences in the CGRs are already captured by the beta factors across the sam-
ple ﬁrms. Hence, a regression analysis is needed to control for covariance risk
embedded in the beta factor before one can draw conclusions about the explana-
tory power of the CGR. While recent cross-country studies rationalize the eﬀect
of governance variables on the expected rates of return with diﬀerent degrees
of international market integration (e.g., Lombardo and Pagano (2000) and
Lombardo (2000)), the setup in the present study circumvents this issue. With-
out agency costs, we assume that markets are eﬃcient and the CAPM holds.
In a world with agency cost, however, the expected rate of return should also
compensate investors for expected monitoring, auditing, and other private costs
associated with diﬀerent corporate governance systems.
The empirical method consists of two steps. First, to estimate company betas,
we run for each ﬁrm a time-series regression of monthly returns on monthly
returns of the DAX 100 index over the sample period. Second, to investigate
whether the CGR has explanatory power that is not captured by the market
beta, we estimate the cross-sectional regression in equation (2). The sample
includes 91 ﬁrms. Regression results are shown in table 9. The table reports the
results of three diﬀerent speciﬁcations; t-statistics are reported underneath the
estimated coeﬃcients, followed by the p-values in brackets.
In column (1) of table 9 we report the regression result of the CAPM for our
sample ﬁrms. The beta enters with a negative coeﬃcient, not in line with the the-
oretical predictions. Irrespective of the direction, the beta’s overall explanatory
power in a univariate analysis is low, with an R-square of 0.8 percent.27 In the
speciﬁcation in column (2), we introduce the CGR into the regression analysis.
In a univariate regression, the coeﬃcient on CGR is positive and signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level. Finally, in column (3) we control for systematic risk. The null
hypothesis that γ2 = 0 can be rejected at the 1 percent level of signiﬁcance, in-
27Defenders of the CAPM would argue that the model deals with expected returns, while
we can only observe actual returns. Actual stock returns reﬂect expectations, but they also
embody ”noise” related to the steady ﬂow of surprises. The noise makes it impossible to judge
whether the model holds during one period better than in another. This is why the ”true”
relationship between the beta and the average risk premium may only materialize over a long
period (see Fama and French (1992)).
24Table 9: Regression results for secondary market returns (OLS)
Regressor (1) (2) (2)
Beta -0.2727 -0.8570∗∗∗
-0.8516 -2.6967
(0.3967) (0.0084)
CGR 0.2476∗∗∗ 0.3275∗∗∗
3.6096 4.5096
(0.001) (0.000)
R-square 0.008 0.128 0.194
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
dicating that ﬁrms with a better corporate governance system experience higher
returns on equity. This evidence is somewhat at odds with the intuition derived
from agency theory. The classic agency perspective predicts that the eﬀect of
better ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance on the expected rate of return is neg-
ative, if it lowers the monitoring, auditing and other private costs of investors.
What can explain the positive relationship between the CGRs and total returns,
which are supposed to act as a proxy for the expected rate of return? We present
three possible explanations.
Unexpected agency costs: The evidence of a positive relationship between
stock returns on secondary markets and CGRs may indicate that investors were
surprised by the relative performance of high-CGR and low-CGR ﬁrms during
the sample period.28 As argued by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001),
this surprise might have been caused by the fact that corporate governance was
cross-sectionally correlated with ”unexpected” agency costs, as proxied by oper-
ating performance, growth, or capital expenditures during the sample period. In
this case, well governed ﬁrms showed better operating and growth characteris-
tics compared to badly governed ﬁrms. In fact, as documented above, ﬁrms in
the principal portfolio showed, on average, a 5 percent higher growth rate than
ﬁrms in the agent portfolio. Therefore, the rationale is as follows: Diﬀerences
in ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance systems (as quantiﬁed by the CGR) caused
diﬀerences in agency costs, and these diﬀerences were not properly incorporated
into market prices at the beginning of the sample period. As soon as investors
realize the diﬀerences in these operating statistics, they either pay a premium
or take a discount on the current stock price at that point in time. A better
28This rationale also holds under the assumption of constant CGRs over the sample period.
It could be that investors of ﬁrm A realize the better operating performance in t0 + 1, and for
ﬁrm B in t0 + 2. The end result is that the historical returns for both ﬁrms are higher.
25ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance system (equal to a higher CGR) improved the
ﬁrm’s operating statistics due to lower agency costs, and it has ultimately led to
higher historical stock returns and increasing shareholder wealth.29 As soon as
the investors’ new expectations have been incorporated into the stock prices, the
relationship between CGRs and expected returns is supposed to be negative.
Closing the value gap: Another argument is that a certain corporate gover-
nance malfunction has led to a stock’s valuation below its fair value or peer group
valuation. In line with the basic objective of corporate governance to ensure an
appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return, better governance will increase the ﬁrm’s
stock price until the value gap is closed and the stock’s valuation is broadly in
line with its peers. Thereafter, assuming no more governance malfunctions, bet-
ter corporate governance standards are associated with lower expected rates of
return. In this case, the temporary appreciation of the ﬁrm’s stock price is driven
by governance activists rather than by the broad market. Governance activists
spot malfunctions early and take an ownership position in the respective ﬁrm.
This ownership position allows them to gain inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s management
and remove eventual governance malfunctions.
Noise eﬀect: Assume a surprise improvement of ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate gover-
nance, e.g., a sudden change in the ﬁrm’s disclosure standards. While this should
reduce the return required by investors, the immediate result is likely to be an
increase in stock prices, i.e., a positive realized return. As argued above, simple
valuation models posit a negative relationship between a ﬁrm’s valuation and the
required rate of return on its shares, all else equal. Given that we estimate ex-
pected returns from realized returns, capturing the negative relationship between
corporate governance and expected returns seems to be diﬃcult, if not impossible.
In summary, there are a number of challenges when estimating the ”true”
correlation between our ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance variable and the expected rate
of return, if historical stock returns are used as a proxy. This is because historical
returns seem less suited to proxy for expected rates of return due to ”noise” and
short-term market reactions on governance changes. Accordingly, a long-term
study with time-varying governance variables would be needed to capture any
negative relationship. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the CGR has signiﬁcant
explanatory power, even over a medium sample period. Due to the diﬃculties
using historical returns as a proxy for expected returns, we proceed using fun-
damental ratios to measure the direction of the relationship between governance
measures and the cost of equity capital.
29See Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001), p. 34.
265.2 Dividend yield and price-earnings ratio
We ﬁrst report the results from estimating the cross-sectional regression in equa-
tion (3). The dependent variable is the average yearly dividend yield over the
sample period. The independent variables are (1) the beta as estimated from a
regression of company stock returns against the returns on the DAX 100 index
over the sample period, (2) the survey-based CGR, and (3) the expected earnings
growth rate, g. If the CAPM holds, the null hypothesis is that γ2 = 0, i.e., there is
no relationship between CGRs and dividend yields. While we expect the dividend
yield to be negatively correlated with g, we do not assume γ3 = −1 to hold, unless
the restrictive assumptions of the Gordon Growth Model would apply. This is un-
likely, since (i) dividends are unlikely to be constant over time, as it is assumed in
the simple Gordon model, (ii) the expected dividend growth rate is not free from
measurement errors, and (iii) dividend growth is ultimately derived from earn-
ings growth, which is only appropriate if payout ratios are constant.30 Expected
growth rates are calculated as the mean of expected earnings per share growth
rates and historical growth rates. In this way, historical growth is ”updated”
with expected earnings growth, which has a forward-looking character. Expected
earnings per share growth rates are derived from IBES expected forward year
earnings per share divided by the IBES expected current year earnings per share.
Historical growth rates are derived from either sales, total asset growth rates,
or the mean of both over the past ﬁve years (depending on data availability).31
The regression results are reported in table 10. Again, t-statistics are shown
underneath the estimated coeﬃcients, followed by the p-values in brackets.
In column (1) we report the results from a regression of dividend yields on
ﬁrm-speciﬁc growth rates as the only independent variable. In line with the-
ory, we ﬁnd a negative and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the expected growth
rate. In a next step, in column (2) we also include the CGR as an independent
variable. As expected, g remains signiﬁcant, but the CGR also enters with a
signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient. The additional explanatory power of the CGR
is also reﬂected in an increasing R-square, with 20 percent as compared to 12.4
percent. Finally, even after controlling for growth prospects and market risk in
column (3), the CGR plays an important role in explaining the cross-sectional
diﬀerences of dividend yields. While the coeﬃcients for growth and the CGR
enter with the correct sign, the beta has a negative coeﬃcient, which is opposite
to what theory predicts. Moreover, similar to the evidence found above, beta’s
explanatory power is negligible, which can be rationalized with ”noise” over a
relatively short measurement period.
30See Lombardo and Pagano (2000), p. 21.
31Datastream datatypes: EPS2 divided by EPS1. Growth rates in excess of 50% (−50%) are
ignored in our analysis. It must be noted that due to the fact that expected earnings growth
rates and/or historical growth rates are not available for many of the small ﬁrms, the sample
is reduced from 91 to 67 ﬁrms.
27Table 10: Regression results for dividend yields (OLS)
Regressor DY (2) (2)
Growth -0.0303∗ -0.0299∗∗ -0.0255∗
-1.9910 -2.0508 -1.7175
(0.0507) (0.0444) (0.0909)
CGR -0.1604∗∗ -0.1310∗∗
-2.5719 -1.9982
(0.0124) (0.0500)
Beta -0.4575
-1.3671
(0.1765)
R-square 0.057 0.146 0.170
∗/∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%/5% level.
Next, we use price-earnings ratios to measure the hypothesized negative rela-
tionship between the CGR and the expected rate of return on equity. We expect
that higher CGRs are associated with higher price-earnings ratios. Following the
speciﬁcation in equation (4), we run a cross-sectional regression of price-earnings
ratios on ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas, CGRs, and expected earnings growth rates. Again,
we test the null hypothesis that γ2 = 0, i.e., there is no relationship between a
ﬁrm’s CGR and its price-earnings ratio. The dependent variable is the mean of
PE1 and PE2 for each ﬁrm at the end of the sample period (March 1, 2002). The
price-earnings ratio variable are deﬁned as the price for a particular stock divided
by consensus forecast earnings per share, either for the current ﬁnancial year or
for the next ﬁnancial year, respectively.32 All independent variables are deﬁned
as described above. Regression results are reported in table 11, t-statistics are
shown underneath the estimated coeﬃcients, followed by the p-value in brackets.
In column (1) we report the basic speciﬁcation including the growth factor as
the only explanatory variable. The sign of the coeﬃcient is positive, but insignif-
icant. When we also include the CGR, controlling for growth, the coeﬃcient on
the governance proxy enters with the correct sign and is signiﬁcant on the 5 per-
cent level. Again, this result is remarkable, because it suggests that ﬁrm-speciﬁc
governance has a higher explanatory power for the level of the price-earnings ratio
than a ﬁrm’s growth prospects. Consequently, the R-square increases from merely
32Datastream datatypes: PE1 and PE2, respectively. It must be noted that due to the
fact that price-earnings ratios from IBES and expected earnings growth rates and/or historical
growth rates are not available for many of the small ﬁrms, the sample is further reduced from
91 to 53 ﬁrms .
28Table 11: Regression results for price-earnings ratios (OLS)
Regressor (1) (2) (2)
Growth 0.0818 0.0962 0.0926
1.1034 1.3293 1.2845
(0.2750) (0.1898) (0.2050)
CGR 0.6496∗∗ 0.5484∗
2.0070 1.6465
(0.0502) (0.1059)
Beta 2.7353
1.2101
(0.2320)
R-square 0.023 0.096 0.122
∗/∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%/5% level.
2 percent without the CGR to almost 10 percent if the CGR is included in the
estimation. Finally, in column (3) we report the full speciﬁcation of the model,
using growth, CGR, and systematic risk as the independent variables. Interest-
ingly, the CGR is the only signiﬁcant variable. We conclude that ﬁrms with
better governance exhibit signiﬁcantly higher price-earnings ratios and, hence,
lower cost of equity capital. Both growth and beta remain insignﬁcant. These
results are again highly inconsistent with the CAPM.
In summary, the estimation methodology used in this section provides fur-
ther evidence that dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are better suited to
proxy for the expected rate of return. First, fundamental variables embody less
amount of ”noise”. Second, since fundamental variables are constantly updated
by expected growth rates, they can be better compared with a one-time gover-
nance variable, which itself has a forward-looking character. Our results show
that expected rates of return depend on other factors than beta, which itself has
virtually no explanatory power in our regressions. Most interesting, and in line
with our main hypothesis, there is a signiﬁcant relationship between expected
returns, as proxied by dividend yields as well as price-earnings ratios, and the
quality of ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance.
5.3 Robustness tests
In the previous sections we have provided evidence that expected returns de-
pend on the governance structure of a ﬁrm in addition to its riskiness. We ﬁnd
a negative relationship between the CGR and proxy measures for the expected
29Table 12: Results for two-stage least square regressions
Regressor RI DY PE
Growth -0.0299∗ 0.0699
-1.7106 0.8683
(0.0921) (0.3895)
CGR 0.8692∗∗ -0.4385∗∗ -0.4338
3.5815 -2.1284 -0.4753
(0.0006) (0.0327) (0.6367)
Beta -1.8235∗∗ 0.0567 4.4113
-3.1990 0.1127 1.5536
(0.0019) (0.9196) 0.1267
R-square 0.200 0.198 0.079
∗/∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%/5% level.
rate of return on equity, such as the dividend yield and price-earnings ratio. An
interpretation may be as follows: Expected returns must compensate investors
not only for ﬁnancial risk, but also for expected monitoring, auditing and other
private costs, which are higher in ﬁrms with less appropriate governance struc-
tures (equal to smaller CGRs). To check whether causation runs from better
corporate governance to lower cost of capital, we re-estimate the regressions in
sections 5.1.-5.3. using two-stage least square. As discussed in section 4.2, we
again use the segment dummy as our instrument to control for endogeneity. Ta-
ble 12 shows the results for all three proxy variables. The results for historical
returns and dividend yields remain qualitatively the same. Speciﬁcally, the coef-
ﬁcients on the governance rating (CGR) are signiﬁcant and of the correct sign.
As before, the coeﬃcients on CGR are somewhat larger compared to the ordinary
least square results. Unfortunately, the results for the price-earnings ratio do not
support our hypothesis. The coeﬃcient on CGR shows up with a negative sign
(which is contrary to what one would expect), but remains insigniﬁcant.
In another robustness test we explore whether diﬀerent industries account for
diﬀerent risk-adjusted expected returns. This may be the case either because mar-
kets are segmented along industries or because diﬀerent industries incur diﬀerent
expected agency costs. Our sector classiﬁcation follows along the 18 industry
indices provided by Dow Jones EURO STOXX. Using average historical returns
as the dependent variable, we run an extended cross-sectional regression:
r = γ01 + γ1βm + γ2CGR + γ3ID1 + γ4ID2 + ... + γ19ID17 + , (7)
where ID1 to ID17 are vectors with industry dummy variables. We test the
30Table 13: Industry robustness test
Regressor RI DY PE
Growth -0.0642∗∗∗ 0.1013
-2.7941 1.1527
(0.0076) (0.2571)
CGR 0.3502∗∗∗ -0.1814∗ 1.0532∗∗
4.2118 -1.6941 2.4083
(0.0001) (0.0970) (0.0216)
Beta -1.1645∗∗∗ -0.0998 0.2514
-3.0900 -0.1735 0.0601
(0.0029) (0.8630) (0.9524)
Industry dummies n.s. n.s. n.s.
R-square 0.332 0.286 0.330
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%/5%/1% level.
null hypothesis that γi = 0, with i = 3,4,...,19. For dividend yields and price-
earnings ratios, the speciﬁcations in (4) and (5) are tested similarly, additionally
expanded by the growth factor, g. The results are shown in table 13. As before,
t-statistics are reported underneath the estimated coeﬃcients, followed by the
p-values in brackets. ”n.s.” stands for ”not signiﬁcant”. The empirical evidence
shows that even after controlling for industry eﬀects, the explanatory power of
the CGR persists in all three regression speciﬁcation. At the same time, none of
the industry dummies enters with a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
6 Conclusions
Corporate governance in Germany has attracted a lot of attention in the last
years. Prominent surveys among institutional shareholders have shown that in-
vestors are willing to pay signiﬁcant premiums for well-governed companies, and
that the valuation of a ﬁrm is at least as dependent on governance practices as it is
on ﬁnancial issues. While the relationship between legal governance variables and
ﬁrm performance has been analyzed in several recent cross-country studies, little
is known how a whole range of non-legal ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance mechanisms
aﬀects the required return on equity within a single jurisdiction. We argue that
legal variables are the only plausible variables to enter into cross-country studies,
since the eﬃciency of other governance variables, such as ownership, board struc-
ture or compensation schemes, is inﬂuenced by country-speciﬁc particularities
which may bias the results in cross-country studies. Moreover, legal variables,
such as judicial eﬃciency, have rather little variation among the developed coun-
31tries. Hence, we expect to draw more reliable conclusions on the relationship
between corporate governance and ﬁrm performance using input data from one
country. In this study, we ﬁll this gap for the German capital market. To proxy
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance, we use a rating system to evaluate the
stringency of a whole range of ﬁrm-speciﬁc ex ante control mechanisms. These
refer to mechanisms which are not required by current law or regulation, but are
rather initiated voluntarily by the ﬁrm itself, and include mechanisms of diﬀer-
ent governance categories, such as general commitment, minority rights, trans-
parency, board matters and auditing. Our results show that there are signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance across German ﬁrms.
To model the relationship between governance and expected returns, we apply
the following rationale: If existing ex ante governance mechanisms are ineﬀective
or inappropriate, large shareholders and institutional shareholders have a higher
incentive to discipline incumbent management for their failures and start mon-
itoring more actively. Since monitoring activities incur costs, investors require
an adequate compensation in the form of a higher expected rate of return on
equity. As soon as ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance practices improve, the re-
quired return on equity decreases. This implies a higher ﬁrm valuation, since the
investors’ monitoring activities are trimmed down. In line with this hypothesis,
we ﬁnd a strong relationship between our corporate governance rating (CGR) and
ﬁrm value. To proxy for the rate of return on equity, we use historical returns,
dividend yields, and price-earnings ratios. We report evidence that there is a neg-
ative (positive) relationship between the CGR and dividend yields (price-earnings
ratios) in a cross-section of German ﬁrms. This observation is in line with the
predictions from agency theory. The relationship between average historical re-
turns and the CGR is signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that higher CGR-ﬁrms
have performed better in the past. We rationalize this evidence with lower un-
expected agency costs and/or the removal of certain governance malfunctions in
high CGR-ﬁrms. Most of our results are robust for endogenity, which implies
that causation is running from corporate governance practices to ﬁrm fundamen-
tals. Finally, an investment strategy that bought high-CGR ﬁrms and shorted
low-CGR ﬁrms would have earned abnormal returns of around 12 percent on an
annual basis during the sample period.
There are three conclusions which can be drawn from our empirical results.
First, ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate governance matters from an asset pricing perspec-
tive. It could be regarded as an additional risk factor for which investors require
an adequate compensation in terms of higher expected returns. Accordingly, the
overall message to listed ﬁrms is simple: By striving for better governance, ﬁrms
are able to further reduce their required return on equity.
Second, although the legal and regulatory environment is not a useful gover-
nance proxy to investigate the relationship of interest within a single jurisdiction
(since all companies are similarly aﬀected), it forms the basis for ”good corporate
32governance”. While we believe that adequate legal protection and prosecution
capabilities are essential for eﬀective corporate governance, we argue that other
governance categories, such as for example board composition and compensation
structures, do not necessarily require further regulation. Instead, with adequate
disclosure and transparency standards in place, it is ultimately the capital mar-
ket which rewards good governance practices (high CGRs) and punishes bad ones
(low CGRs). To this end, corporate governance should be understood as a chance
and not an obligation from a ﬁrm’s perspective.
Third, there are implications for large shareholders and institutional investors.
In Germany large blockholders as well as institutional shareholders have been
rather passive in the past in monitoring and disciplining incumbent management
teams. This may also be the reason why studies analyzing whether bank or
block ownership is associated with better ﬁrm performance show a mixed pic-
ture. To date, there is no evidence for the German market whether institutional
shareholder activism is associated with any short- or long-term wealth eﬀects.
However, with governance being a more popular topic for the management and
supervision of ﬁrms, we believe that professional investors will become more ac-
tive in shareholder engagement programs in the future. Ceteris paribus, this will
ultimately lead to higher expected returns and lower valuations for those ﬁrms
with governance deﬁcits, since investors want to be compensated for their in-
creased monitoring and second opinion activities. Similarly, by removing certain
governance malfunctions, large investors are able to achieve a higher valuation
for their assets, since their required return becomes lower.
In Germany more stringent legislative measures have been put in force only re-
cently, including the 4th Financial Market Promotion Law and the Transparency
and Disclosure Law, to enhance stock market integrity. While the Transparency
and Disclosure Law forms the legal basis for the German Corporate Governance
Code to become binding as a soft-law supplement, some of principal measures of
the Financial Market Promotion Law include: (1) establishment of the central
Federal Institute for Financial Services Supervision to enable eﬀective action to
be taken against price and market manipulation, (2) mandatory disclosure with-
out delay of dealings by members of management and supervisory boards of all
listed companies and their close relatives in stocks of the ﬁrms they represent,
and (3) establishing a basis for investors to claim compensation for the eﬀects
of late, omitted, or incorrect disclosure of price-sensitive information by ﬁrms.
In light of the recent corporate governance failures, the list of claims for more
rigorous law and regulation to protect investors in Germany is long, such as for
example a similar move as the SEC’s to oblige CEOs and CFOs to personally
certify their ﬁrms’ accounts. There are also plans to boost shareholder rights by
taking actions against members of a ﬁrm’s management and supervisory boards
in cases of false or misleading information. Existing German securities law is
regarded as too restrictive by investors’ representatives, as it only allows action
33to be taken against a company, rather than individuals.
It should also be pointed out that adequate ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance stan-
dards are not a substitute for the solidity of a ﬁrm’s business model. Unproven
business models and inexperienced management practices cannot be healed with
super-transparent disclosure and transparency standards. This is also the reason
why the decline of the Neuer Markt and its recent announced closure is not at-
tributable to the growth market’s governance standards (in fact, they have been
the strictest in Germany), but rather to its poor eligibility rules in the early years
of the market segment’s existence and a record of corporate scandals. It is even
envisaged that the Neuer Markt’s current disclosure, transparency and listing
requirements will apply to the new ”Prime Standard” that will include both the
DAX 30 blue-chip stocks and as well as mid-cap stocks divided into ”Classic”
and ”Technology”.
Finally, our results raise more questions for future research. In Germany, lit-
tle is known about the role and design of shareholder engagement activities by
blockholders and institutional investors and associated wealth eﬀects. If the bet-
ter governance practices of the high-CGR ﬁrms can be attributed to shareholder
activism prior to their implementation, the message to professional investors is
clear: By identifying ﬁrms with solid business models but current governance
slacks, shareholder engagement activities may lead to higher actual returns until
the governance practices have improved. The impact on equity markets is even
more far-reaching. If professional investors generally incur higher costs due to
more engagement activities and face higher risk in light of the recent governance
failures, then a general revaluation of stocks is likely to compensate investors for
owning equity in the market place. However, to make a more reliable statement
of the relationship between ﬁrms-speciﬁc governance and expected returns on eq-
uity, we would need to regress time-varying governance variables on performance
measures. Moreover, it would be interesting to know whether the negative rela-
tionship between governance practices and expected returns can be also found in
other Western countries with a similar legal environment.
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Note: HGB is the “Handelsgesetzbuch” according to German law. 
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